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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW--REOVAL OF PUBLIC OFFICER-FAIRNESS OF HEARING.~
The relator, a police captain, by sending a letter directly to the defendant, the
acting mayor of the City of Buffalo, had disregarded a departmental rule
requiring communications to be made through the Chief of Police. For this
he had been demoted to the rank of patrolman by the defendant. Notice
and a hearing had been given, according to the city charter, and certiorari
proceedings were brought to review the trial. The evidence showed that,
although ill will existed between the relator and the defendant, the latter had
acted as judge in the proceedings which found the former guilty. Held, that
the prejudice of the acting mayor was insufficient to disqualify him as judge,
but that there had been on the merits no such violation of the departmental
rules as to warrant demotion. People v. Kreinheder (1921) 197 App. Div. 887,
189 N. Y. Supp. 767.
In the absence of statute, the power of removal from public office is
incidental to the power of appointment. Burnap v. United States (1920) 252
U. S. 512, 40 Sup" Ct. 374; Kydd v. San Francisco (1918) 37 Calif. App.
598, 174 Pac. 88. An incumbent for an indefinite term holds office at the
discretion of the person holding the appointing power. Barbor v. County Court
(1920) 85 W. Va. 359, IOI S. E. 721. Where however, the term is fixed by law,
removal is possible only as the state constitution or statute may direct. State
v. Hough (1915) lO3 S. C. 87, 87 S. E. 436. Police departments ordinarily
derive their organization from city charters, which designate a method of
removal. Thus where notice and a hearing are provided, a failure to comply
with the statute renders a dismissal of no effect. State v. Wilkinso, (1921) 59
Mont. 327, 196 Pac. 878. The hearing must be fair. Eisberg v. Mayor (1919,
Sup. Ct.) 92 N. J. L. 321, 1O5 At. 716. Where a board of police commissioners
conduct the hearing, an interested commissioner may not sit as judge. People
v Roosevelt (1897) 23 App. Div. 533, 48 N. Y. Supp. 578. But the mere filing
of charges by a commissioner does not thus disqualify him as a judge. State
v. Burney (1917) 269 Mo. 602, 191 S. W. 981. The removal proceeding is
reviewable by a court which will determine whether the finding of fact is sup-
ported by the evidence. McCarthy v. Board (1915) 38 R. I. 385, 95 At. 921.
But where any evidence sustains the finding, the reviewing court will not pass
on the facts. Cole v. City of Portland (192o) 96 Ore. 645, 19o Pac. 720. The
sufficiency of the cause of removal has been held to be a question of law for the
court. Stanley v. Fiscal Court (1921) 19o Ky. 495, 227 S. W. 813. Hence
a removal will not be sustained where the accused has been guilty of a mere
technical violation of the police regulation. People v. McAdoo (19o7) 117 App.
Div. 438, 102 N. Y. Supp. 656. The court in the instant case quite properly
reinstated the relator, for a slight infraction of department rules should not call
for such a severe punishment as demotion. The case might well have held that
the Mayor was too prejudiced against the relator to act as judge at the hearing.
ADmIRALTY-SEAitiEN'S RIGHT TO NEV CONTRACT BEFORE COMPLETION OF
VOYAGE.-The libellants, seamen, signed for a six months' voyage to an African
port and return to the United States. The vessel, delayed by trouble, was at
Accra, on the African West coast, at the expiration of the six months. The crew
demanded double wages for the return trip and the master acceded under protest.
Upon landing in Philadelphia he refused to abide by the agreement. Held, that
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the crew were entitled to double -wages from Gibraltar, the nearest port where
a consul could have considered the question, although the vessel had in fact
never touched there. Shanley v. United States (1921, E. D. N. Y.) 274 Fed. 691.
A master is not privileged to discharge his crew nor has the crew a right
to wages in full until the end of the voyage. Schermacher v. Yates (1893, E. D.
N. Y.) 57 Fed. 668. The end of the voyage is not a port of distress, but one
of destination. Fairchild v. The Aurelius (1914, D. Mass.) Fed. Cas. No.
46o9. An extension of the voyage by intention or neglect of the master is such
a breach of the contract as entitles the seamen to demand their release in any
safe port. The Hotspur (1874, D. Or.) 3 Sawyer, 194. But an extension of
the voyage as in the instant case, beyond the time stipulated, due to perils of the
sea which could not reasonably be guarded against, is not a breach of the
contract as to time and does not privilege the seamen to leave the vessel nor
demand wages in full before reaching the port of destination. Hamiltonv. United
States (192o, C. C. A. 4 th) 268 Fed. 15. The new contract obtained by the
libellants was prematurely demanded and void at its inception. Some courts
have held such contracts entirely void as contrary to public policy. Bartlett v.
Wyman (1817, N. Y.) 14 Johns. 26o. But the instant case, by validating the
agreement in part, adopts the more general and equitable principles of courts
of admiralty in construing contracts of seamen. Brice v. The Nancy (1783, Pa.
St. Adm. Ct.) Fed. Cas. No. 1855; The Helen Fairlamb (1918, E. D. Pa.) 251
Fed. 412.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--ATToRNEY's ImPLIED AuTHORITY-PWER TO BIND CLI-
ENT IN JUDGMENT BY CONSENT.-In a summary proceeding in ejectment, the
jury gave possession of the property to the plaintiff and fixed the rental at an
amount considerably higher than was warranted by the evidence. Upon an
intimation by the court that the verdict would be set aside unless the rental were
reduced, the plaintiff's attorney, disregarding his client's express instructions but
believing that he was acting for the latter's best interest, consented to the reduc-
tion. Held, that such a judgment should be set aside upon motion by the client.
Bizzell v. Auto Tire & Equipment Co. (1921, N. C.) io8 S. E. 439.
The authority of an attorney extends to all the customary incidents of litiga-
tion, being especially broad during the actual progress of the trial, as prompt
action is then essential. Christy v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. (1916, C. C. A. 8th)
233 Fed. 255; Dixon v. Floyd (19o6) 73 S. C. 202, 53 S. E. 167. A material
right, such as that of trial by jury, may not be waived without the client's consent.
Lyman v. Kaul (1916) 275 Ill. II, 113 N. E. 944. But the attorney may agree
to omit certain evidence. Szunyog v. Kiss (i92o, Sup. Ct.) 182 N. Y. Supp. 898.
He may permit the court to fix the allowance for counsel fees, although no evi-
dence as to what they should be has been introduced. Callahan v. Callahan
(192o, Idaho) 192 Pac. 66o. He may consent to a judgment in.debt, in considera-
tion of the withdrawal of an allegation of tort. See So. Chemical Co. v. Bass
(1918) 175 N. C. 426, 95 S. E. 766. And his client is concluded by an admission
of fact during the trial, or by a judgment based upon an agreed statement of
facts. Oregon-Washington Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Reed (1917) 87 Or. 398, 169 Pac.
342; Scotti v. District Court (1920) 42 R. I. 556, 1O9 AtI. 207. But the court has
power to relieve a party from an improvident agreement that would otherwise
be binding. Humphries v. Shapiro (I919) 187 App. Div. 96, 175 N. Y. Supp.
426. A distinction is drawn between the attorney's power to compromise a
client's cause of action and his power to confess judgment. Parr v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. (1916) 194 Mo. App. 416, 184 S. W. i16q. The former is not per-
missible unless there is no time in which to communicate with the client without
hazarding a loss. Gibson v. Nelson (19io) III Minn. 183, 126 N. W. 731. And
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he can never compromise a judgment or release a judgment debtor. McGill v.
Coleman (1921, Mich.) 182 N. W. 76. The authorities differ as to his power to
consent to a judgment. Some cases hold that an employment to defend cannot
include the power to settle, and that a decree based upon such a consent is not
binding on the client. Nothem v. Vonderharr (i92o, Iowa) 175 N. W. 967.
Others hold the judgment binding and give a remedy against the attorney only.
Chicago Benev. Soc. v. Chicago Aid Soc. (1918) 283 Ill. 99, 118 N. E. lO12.
While still others feel bound to recognize the assumed authority of the attorney
and to hold the decree binding, but when informed that the attorney acted against
his client's express instructions, exercise their power to vacate the judgment
entered upon the agreement, if the parties can be put in statu quo. Dalton v. West
End St. Ry. (1893) 159 Mass. 221, 34 N. E. 261; Beliveau. v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.
(1895) 68 N. H. 225, 40 Atl. 734. Although the agreement in the instant case
seems to have been decidedly advantageous to an insistent client, the Court was
clearly sound in following a rule so obviously necessary for the protection of a
client's interest.
BANKRUpTcY-TitusTEE'S INTEREST IN LIFE INsuRAxcE PoLicy-EFFEcT OF PAY-
MENT TO BENEFrcra.RY-The bankrupt carried life insurance having cash sur-
render value, the policy being payable to his wife but reserving to him the power
to change the beneficiary with the written approval of the company and surrender
of the policy. After adjudication and appointment of the trustee, the bankrupt
died and the company, without actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings,
paid the full amount of the policy to the widow. Thereafter the trustee sued
the company for the cash surrender value. Held, that he was not entitled to
recover. Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1921, U. S.) 41 Sup. Ct. 503.
The power of the insured to change the beneficiary and obtain the cash sur-
render value of the policy was an asset which passed to the trustee in bankruptcy.
Cohen v. Samuels (1917) 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36; see (1917) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 403; Cohen v. Malone (1919) 248 U. S. 450, 39 Sup. Ct. 141; see
(1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 603. The trustee contended that the company,
though without actual knowledge of the proceedings, could not deprive him of
this asset by making payment to the beneficiary, on the principle that a petition
in bankruptcy is a caveat to all the world. Mueller v. Nugent (19oi) 184 U. S.
I, 22 Sup. Ct. 269. This principle is subject to some exceptions on grounds of
policy. Jones v. Springer (1912) 226 U. S. 148, 33 Sup. Ct. 64. The decision in
the instant case, however, was not on the ground of an exception to the caveat
principle, but on the ground that this principle had no application whatever. The
trustee's "title" was only such power to change the beneficiary as the policy
created. Until this power was exercised by the trustee, by giving the company
actual notice and making demand for a change, the right of the original benefi-
ciary to receive payment in full upon proof of the death of the insured and the
surrender of the policy, and the correlative duty of the company to make pay-
ment, remained unimpaired. Sullivan v. Maroney (1909) 76 N. J. Eq. 1O4, 73
At. 842. The company, in paying the widow, did nothing more than discharge
its legal duty, and this, done in good faith, necessarily destroyed the power there-
after to change the beneficiary. The decision is undoubtedly sound in protecting
the company from any further liability under the policy. In case of a policy
payable to the estate of the insured, on the other hand, the trustee has an
immediate right to the cash surrender value against the company, instead of a
mere power, and, it is submitted, the company can discharge its duty as to this
amount only by payment to the trustee. Cf. Everett v. Judson (1913) 228 U. S.
474, 33 Sup. Ct. 568; Andrews v. Partridge (1913) 228 U. S. 479, 33 Sup. Ct. 570.
While the trustee, in the instant case, had no right against the company, the.
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decision is not inconsistent with 'a recovery from the widow, against whom
the trustee would seem entitled to the advantages of an equitable assignee. Cf.
Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins. Co. (192o) 192 App. Div. 562, 183 N. Y.
Supp. 251.
BANKS AND BANKING-MONEY STANDING ON CURRENT ACCOUNT--DEMAND
NEcEsSARY BEFORE CAUSE OF ACTION AccRUEs.-A partnership, which carried
an account with the defendant bank, dissolved on August I, 1914, with a balance
of £2,321. No money was paid out of the acount after this date. In June,
1919, the plaintiff, one of the partners, sued in the firm name for the balance
due, claiming that the cause of action had accured on August 1, 1914. The
defendant denied that the cause of action had accrued on that date because
no demand for payment had been made at that time. Held, that as a demand
for payment was essential, the.plaintiff could not recover. N. Joachimson v.
Swiss Bank Corporation [1921, C. A.] 3 K. B. IIO..
The rule in England has been that the Statute of Limitations runs against a
bank deposit as against any other contract debt. Pott v. Clegg (1847, Exch.)
16 M. & W. 321; I Hals. Laws Eng. 586; Grant, Bankers and Banking (2d ed.
1865) 3. Based upon this rule, the supposition has arisen that a cause of action
accrues to bank depositors without a demand and refusal. In America the
rule is well established that a demand for repayment is a condition precedent
to the maintenance of an action against a bank for an amount on deposit. First
National Bank of Mishawaka v. Stapf (19o5) 165 Ind. 162, 74 N. E. 987; Clark's
Adv'r v. Farmers' National Bank (19o7) 124 Ky. 563, 99 S. W. 674; Tiffany,
Banks and Banking (1912) 9o. Consequently the Statute of Limitations does
not begin to run until there has been a demand and refusal. Missouri Pacific
Ry. v. Continental National Bank (1908) 212 Mo. 505, III S. W. 574; Tiffany,
op. cit. 93; contra, Union Bank v. Kwpp (1825, Mass.) 3 Pick. 96; Carter,
Banks and Banking (5th ed. 1917) 598. There are certain circumstances
under which a demand is not necessary. When a depositor has demanded the
full amount of his deposit, and has been paid a part thereof, he is not required
to make a separate demand for the balance. Lebrecht v. New State Bank (igi8)
199 Mo. App. 642, 205 S. W. 273. When a bank disputes its indebtedness to a
depositor, no demand is necessary to support the depositor's action. Marks v.
First National Bank of Roseburg (1917) 84 Or. 6oi, 165 Pac. 673; Lifschutz v.
Public Bank of New York City (1916, Sup. Ct.) 159 N. Y. Supp. 879. The
principal case has reached a conclusion, in accord with the American authorities,
which seems best fitted to the commercial needs of the day.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ElCTIoNS-VALIDITy OF ABSENTEE-VOTING AcT.7The
New Hampshire House of Representatives asked the opinion of the Justices of
the Supreme Court as to the validity of certain proposed state legislation to pro-
vide for voting at the biennial elections by persons absent from the places in
which they were qualified to vote. Advised, that the legislature may not author-
ize absentee voting for state officers; that it may authorize *such voting for presi-
dential electors; that it is doubtful whether its auhorization of such voting for
Senators and Representatives in Congress would be held valid. Opinion of the
Justices (1921, N. H.) 113 Atl. 293.
A state legislature has authority to direct the manner of appointment of presi-
dential electors, except with respect to the time of appointment. U. S. Const.
art. 2, sec. I; McPherson v. Blacker (1892) 146 U. S. I, 13 Sup. Ct. 3; (1913)
43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 282, 284, note. Congress has the paramount power to regulate
the time and manner of holding elections for members of the Senate, and the
time, manner, hnd place for members of the House of Representatives, and so far
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as the power is exercised the federal regulations supersede state laws inconsistent
therewith. U. S. Const. art. I, secs. 2, 4, amendment 17; (1902) 53 L. R. A.
66o, 663 note. A state statute providing for voting by soldiers on active service
has been considered valid by the House of Representatives in the case of an
election of a member thereto, while the same statute was held unconstitutional by
the state court as to the election of a state officer. People v. Blodgett (1865)
13 Mich. 127; Baldwin v. Trowbridge (1866) 2 Bart. Cont. Elec. Cas. 46 (in the
thirty-ninth Congress) with respect to election under Mich. Laws, 1864, no. 21.
The validity of a state statute providing that absentees from their place of resi-
dence may vote for state officers is obviously ascertained in any given case by the
provisions of the state constitution. Jenkins v. Board of Elections (1920) 18o
N. C. i69, iO4 S. E. 346; Opinion to the Governor (1918) 41 R. L 118, io2 Atl.
913; Stranghan v. Meyers (1916) 268 M o. 580, 187 S. W. 1159.
CONTRAcTs-GAmBLING--REcovERY OF MoNEY PAID BY CHECK.-The plaintiff,
having lost his wager on a horse race, gave his check to the defendant book-
maker, who endorsed the check in blank and handed it to his bankers for collec-
tion. It was presented to the plaintiff's bank and paid. The plaintiff then
brought suit under the Gaming Act (1835) 5 & 6 Wm. IV, c. 41, sec. 2, which
allowed the drawer of a bill given in payment of a gambling debt to recover from
the payee the money paid to a holder of it. Held, that the plaintiff should
recover. Sutters v. Briggs (1921, H. L.) 38 T. L. R. 30.
Negotiable paper given in payment of a gambling debt is invalid as between
the original parties because the consideration is illegal. Anson, Contract (Cor-
bin's ed. igig) 311. A holder in due course may collect on such security, how-
ever, in the absence of statutes making it absolutely void. Fitch v. Jones (855,
Q. B.) 5 El. & Bl. 238; Wilson v. National Fowler Bank (1911) 47 Ind. App. 689,
95 N. E. 269. And the maker thus compelled to pay the holder cannot recover
from the payee. Haynes v. Rudd (188o) 83 N. Y. 251. If the loser in a gam-
bling transaction voluntarily pays the winner, he cannot recover the payment at
common law because he is in pari delicto. Thistlewood v. Cracroft (1813, K. B.)
I Ma. & Sel. 5oo; Davies & Co. v. Porter (ig18, C. C. A. 8th) 248 Fed. 397.
Statutes in many states allow a recovery, however. Stimson, American Statute
Law (1886) sec. 4132; see Gaming Act (1710) 9 Anne, c. 14 repealed by Gaming
Act (1845) 8 & 9 Vict. c. log, sec. 15. Under the Gaming Act (1835) 5 & 6 Win.
IV, c. 41, which allowed a holder for value without notice to collect a security
given in gambling transactions, the maker could recover the money paid to the
holder from the person to whom he originally gave such paper. It would seem
that the maker could only recover payments made to such holders as could
compel him to pay. Nicholls v. Evans [1914] I K. B. 118; see Lynn v. Bell
(1876) IO Ir. R. C. L. 487; see Hyams v. Stuart King [19o8, C. A.] 2 K. B. 696,
714. "Holder," as ordinarily used, means, however, any bearer and includes the
payee or his agent for collection. Chalmers, Bills of Exchange (8th ed. 1919) 5.
The absence of any limitations in the statute on the sort of holder intended, and
the inability of the drawer or his bank to know whether the person presenting
the check is a holder in due course or not, led the court in the instant case to
adopt this construction of the term "holder" in the statute and to allow the
maker of a check to recover money paid to any "holder." The court affirmed the
decisions in other recent cases which have tended toward the same conclusion.
Golding v. Bradlaw [1919] 2 K. B. 238; Dey v. Mayo [1920, C. A.] 2 K. B. 346.
Thus the courts have created the peculiar anomaly in England that a loser may
recover his gambling wagers paid by check but not those paid in cash. To
remedy the situation a bill has already been passed by the House of Lords repeal-
ing this section of the statute. See (192i) 66 SoL. JoUr. 56.
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CONTRACTS-SALE OF STANDING TimBER-WHEN AGREEmENT. DOES NoT PAss
TITLE AND VENDEE REPUDIATE.-The vendor and vendee entered into a written
contract, not under seal, for the sale of all standing timber on a certain tract of
land for $Iooooo, payable in four annual instalments. A statute required a seal
on every deed or other conveyance of real estate. N. H. Pub. Sts. 19oi, ch. 137,
sec. 3. The vendee, after having cut some of the wood and having made two
payments, notified the vendor that it abandoned the contract. The vendor, deny-
ing the power of the vendee to terminate the contract, brought an action for the
third instalment. Held, that the contract created merely a license in the vendee
to enter upon the land and cut the timber, and the vendee, having received what he
bargained for, became indebted for the specified sum of money payable under
the contract. George W. Blanchard & Sons Co..v. American Realty Co. (1921,
N. H.) 115 Atl. 4.
A sale of growing timber is the sale of an interest in land, and consequently
within the Statute of Frauds. I Tiffany, Real Property (192o ed.) 886. The
statute in the instant case gave a written contract without a seal the same effect
as if it were oral. See Kingsley v. Holbrook (1864) 45 N. H. 313. The contract,
therefore, created a mere license. I Tiffany, op. cit. 887; Fish v. Capwell (1894)
I8 R. I. 667, 29 Atl. 840. Such a license is personal, and not assignable. Ward
v. Rapp (1890) 79 Mich. 469, 44 N. W. 934. This gave the vendee the privilege
to enter upon the land of the vendor, and the power to vest in himself title to as
much timber as he might cut. Starks v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co. (1914) 182
Mo. App. 241, 167 S. W. 1198. But the license might at any time have been
revoked, and the revocation would have been effective as to all the timber left
standing. Hodsdon v. Kennett (1905) 73 N. H. 225, 6o Atl. 686. The statement
in the court's opinion that the revocation of the license might have been enjoined
is probably to be referred to a state of facts in which the purchase money had
been fully paid. Had the vendee, in the instant case, specifically contracted for
a privilege to cut timber, the court would have been correct in holding that the
vendee must pay the contract price since he received what he bargained for, and
it was no fault of the vendbr that the vendee did not use his privilege. The par-
ties, however, intended to buy and sell timber and so stated in their agreement,
but their intention was not effectuated in a binding contract because the agree-
ment was not in proper statutory form. At the instant the writing was signed by
the parties no rights or correlative duties were created in either the vendor or
vendee. It was merely equivalent to an offer for the sale of trees with the privi-
lege in the vendee to enter and cut the trees, and the power to accept by such
cutting. See Erskine v. Savage (i9O1) 96 Me. 57, 5I Atl. 242. The statute
changed a contract to sell standing timber into merely a revocable, unassignable
privilege; and to say that the vendee agreed to pay $IOo0o for this privilege was
to make a new contract for the parties. It is submitted that the vendor was
entitled, in quasi-contract, only to the value of the timber cut by the vendee.
EQUITY-BENEFIT SOCIETIES-MEMBER MUST EXHAUST REmEDIES WITHIN THE
ORDER BEFoRE BRINGING SUIT-The plairitiff was suspended from the defendant
lodge until he should pay a sum said to have become due through his alleged
misconduct. By the laws of the Order a lodge was empowered to inflict the
following penalties upon its members: reprimand or censure in open lodge, sus-
pension for a definite time, expulsion, and a fine not exceeding five dollars. The
rules of the Order gave a "right" of appeal within the lodge to either party to a
controversy. Without taking such an appeal, the plaintiff sought damages and an
injunction to compel restoration to him of the rights and privileges of member-
ship. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to relief, because the decision of the
lodge was void, being outside the lodge's jurisdiction, and therefore no appeal
was necessary. Gardner v. East Rock Lodge (i921, Conn.) 113 Atl. 3o8.
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The rule is often broadly stated that where associations, voluntary or incor-
porated, have provided tribunals for the redress of grievances a member must
exhaust those remedies before seeking relief in court. Hickey v. Baine (19o7)
I95 Mass. 446, 81 N. E. 20; Pixley v. Cleaver (192o, Neb.) 18I N. W. 138;
Loeffler v. Modern Woodinen (1898) 100 Wis. 79, 75 N. W. 1012. This is with-
out doubt the rule as to voluntary associations where no property rights are
involved, and when the procedure is in good faith, according to the rules of the
order and not in violation of municipal law, and it is only to determine those
requirements that the courts will interfere at all. Zeliff v. Knights of Pythias
(1891) 53 N. J. L. 536, 22 Atl. 63; Willis v. Davis (192i, Tex. Civ. App.) 233
9. W. 1035. But the courts have been reluctant to recognize any abridgment of
a right of access to them for the enforcement of property or contractual rights.
See Bater v. Samson (1885) io2 Ind. 262, I N, E. 571 ; Keefe v. Womet's Order
(1896) 162 Ill. 78, 44 N. E. 4Ol. A few jurisdictions entirely deny such a power
of abridgment by the lodge contract. Kelly v. Trimont Lodge (91o) 154
N. C. 97, 69 S. E. 764. And the majority of the states will not uphold a stipula-
tion in the lodge contract if it tends to oust the courts of entire jurisdiction by
making the decisions of the tribunals of the order conclusive. Zaremba v. Intl
Harvester Corp. (1916) 162 Wis. 231, 155 N. W. 114; Bauer v. Samson, supra;
contra, Fillmore v. Great Camp (1895) 1O9 Mich. 13, 61 N. W. 785. Where the
provision for appeal is merely permissive the better rule seems to be that the
aggrieved party is not bound to exhaust his remedies within the order before
appealing to the court. 2 Bacon, Life & Accident Ins. (4th ed. 1917) sec. 624;
Grand Lodge v. Grogan (1829) 44 Ill. App. III. Since under the rules of con-
tractual construction, the contract of a mutual benefit society must be construed
against it and in favor of the member, to impose upon a member the duty of
exhausting the remedies within the order before appealing to the courts, where
he has not expressly agreed to do so, seems to violate this rule of construction
and vary the terms of the contract. The basis of the decision in the principal
case carries with it the weight of authority. Rueb v. Rehder (1918) 24 N. M.
534, 174 Pac. 995; Keefe v. Womein's Order, supra. But it is submitted that the
court might well have held that the plaintiff was under no duty first to exhaust
the remedies within the order, irrespective of the void judgment.
EQTUITY-CHuRCH PROPERTY-POWER OF MAJORITY TO CHfANGE DocTRINE AND
RETAIN CoNTRo.-In 1905 a group established and obtained a charter for "St.
Michael's Greek Catholic Church." In 1919 the church trustees, with the
approval of a majority of the members, appointed a pastor who changed the
form of worship to the Russian Orthodox faith and refused admission to thE.
priest appointed by the bishop of the Greek Catholic Church. The minority
brought suit to restrain the action of the trustees, and to determine who should
have the use and control of the church property. Held, that the trustees must
admit the Greek Catholic priest, but that the property should remain in their
custody. Chrapko v. Kobasa (1921, Pa.) 114 Atl. 254.
It is well settled that unless civil or property rights are involved, courts will
not pass upon differences between contending factions of a church. Stallings v.
Finney (1919) 287 Ill. 145, 122 N. E. 369. And the ecclesiastical and doctrinal
questions will only be inquired into so far as may be necessary to determine
the property rights of the parties. Mendelsohn v. Gordon (1913, Tex. Civ. App.)
i56 S. W. ii49; Gibson v. Singleton (i919) 149 Ga. 502, ioi S. E. 178. If a
religious organization has a tribunal with jurisdiction to decide differences
between its members as to creed or doctrine, the majority of courts will accept
the judgment of the church tribunal as conclusive upon them. Manning v.
Yeager (1919) 2o3 Ala. I85, 82 So. 435; Presbyterian Church v. Lincoln Firsi
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Cumberland Presbyterian Church (IIo) 245 Ill. 74, 91 N. E. 761; Krecker v.
Shirey (1894) 163 Pa. 534, 30 AtI. 44o. A few courts regard the decision of a
church tribunal as establishing a mere presumption which is not conclusive upon
them in the settlement of property rights. Monk v. Little (1916) 122 Ark. ii,
182 S. W. 511. The instant case is in accord with the almost universal rule
that the majority faction of a church cannot divert the property to another
denomination or to the support of doctrines radically and fundamentally opposed
to the characteristic doctrines of the original faith, to which a minority still
clings. Baptist City Mission Soc. v. People's Tabernacle Congregational Church
(1918, Colo.) 174 Pac. 1118; Lindstrom v. Tell (1915) 131 Minn. 203, 154 N. W.
969; Kicinko v. Petruska (1917) 259 Pa. I, 102 Atl. 286. Where no particular
doctrine is designated in a deed or grant to trustees, the nature of the trust is
ascertained by reference to the circumstances, such as, the denominational name,
the doctrine actually taught at the time, and the length of time such a doctrine
has continued to be taught without interruption. Hale v. Everett (1868) 53
N. H. 9; Lindstrom v. Tell, supra.
EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENcE-ADIIISSIBILITY OF SlimiLAR ACCIDENTS.-The plaintiff
sued the municipality for damages to an automobile driven against an unlighted
concrete wall at the end of a bridge. The testimony of the police officer on the
beat as to the number of accidents that had occurred at this place was rejected.
Held, that it was not error to exclude testimony of other accidents at the same
place in the absence of evidence that the same weather conditions prevailed.
Charles v. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore (192i, Md.) 114 Aft. 565.
There is 'considerable conflict as to the admissibility of evidence of previous
accidents at the same place to prove negligence on a particular occasion. Phillips
v. Willow (1887) 70 Wis. 6, 34 N. W. 731; Kress & Co. v. Markline (1918) 117
Miss. 37, 77 So. 858. Some courts, considering such evidence as raising too many
collateral issues, have held it entirely incompetent. Williams v. Inhabitants of
Winthrop (913) 213 Mass. 581, 1oo N. E. 11O1. A comparison of the decisions
with a careful distinguishing of the facts will reconcile a great number of the
cases. The admissibility of such evidence is best determined by its probative
bearing on the case before the court. (911) 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104, note. The
majority apply the .test of relevancy. I Jones, Evidence (Horwitz ed. 1913) sec.
163, 164. So where the court has thought the testimony of previous accidents to
be irrelevant and more collateral than probative, it has been rightly excluded.
Langworthy v. Green (1891) 88 Mich. 207, 50 N. W. I3O; Barrett v. Hammond
(1894) 87 Wis. 654, 58 N. W. 1053. But such evidence is admitted by the major-
ity of courts also to show notice of the dangerous character of the place of the
accident. District of Columbia v. Armes (1883) 107 U. S. 519, 2 Sup. Ct. 840;
Kress & Co. v. Markline, supra. However, testimony as to the absence of pre-
vious accidents at the same place and from the same cause is usually excluded
as too remote and as raising too many collateral 'issues. Cochran v. Kankakee
Co. (913) 179 Ill. App. 437. Previous accidents, if relevant, are not objection-
able on the mere ground of surprise. Smith v. Seattle (1903) 33 Wash. 481, 74
Pac. 674. Certainly, to be relevant, the previous accidents must have occurred
under conditions similar to those in the case before the court. Samuels v. Ry.
(1912, Tex. Civ. App.) 15o S. W. 291; Chesapeake Ry. v. Kellys Adm'x (1914)
i6o Ky. 296, 16q S. W. 736. The trial court correctly used its discretion in
excluding the evidence.
INJUNCTIONS-CONTINUED TRESPASS TO PERSONAL PROPERTY-BALANCE OF Cow-
VENIENCE.-The defendant railroad seized coal shipments in transit whenever its
own supply was interfered with by labor troubles. The defendant always offered
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to pay the invoice price of the coal, plus ten per cent, but the plaintiff, whose
shipments had been taken in this manner, sought to enjoin any such further
seizures by the railroad. Held, that an injunction should be granted. Mobile v.
Zimmern (1921, Ala.) 89 So. 475.
The defence to this admitted tort was that the seizures were affected with a
public interest, and that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. The ques-
tion, therefore, was whether the court should take into consideration the balance
of convenience, when it would otherwise restrain the threatened tort. As between
the plaintiff and the defendant, there is some authority for the view that the
balance of convenience should be the deciding factor. Beidenkopf v. Des Moines
Life Ins. Co. (1913) 16o Iowa, 629, 142 N. W. 434; Smith v. Rowland (1914)
243 Pa. 306, 90 Atl. 183; McCarthy v. Bunker Hill (igo6, C. C. Idaho) 147 Fed.
981, aff. in (199o) 212 U. S. 583, 29 Sup. Ct. 692. Where the general public inter-
est is involved, the courts seem to be more willing to apply this doctrine. Frost
v. City of Los Angeles (1919) 181 Calif. 22, 183 Pac. 342; Andrews v. Cohen
(1917) 221 N. Y. 148, 116 N. E. 862; Booth-Kelly Co. v. Eugene (1913) 67 Or.
381, 136 Pac. 29. In the absence of this public interest, however, many courts
refuse to apply the rule of comparative damage. Felsenthal v. Warring (1919,
Calif. App.) i8o Pac. 67; Longton- v. Stedman (1914) 182 Mich. 405, 148 N. W.
738. The instant case, involving a continued trespass, is to be distinguished from
the cases involving a nuisance, as a different rule is applied. (1919) 29 YALE
LAW JoURNAL, 240. It seems to accept the more general view that the balance of
convenience should not control where a continuous trespass is involved. 5
Pomeroy, Equity (4 th ed. 1919) sec. 1922; (192o) IS MicH. L. REV. 703; Hansen
v. Crouch (192o, Or.) 193 Pac. 454.
JURISDICTION-INDIAN COURTS-PowlRs OF STATE COURTS IN CONTROVERSIES
OVER INDIAN RESERVATION LANDS.-A peacemaker's court had been recognized on
the Cattaraugus Indian Reservation. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 26, sec. 46. This
court had "exclusive jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine all questions and
actions between individual Indians," residing on the reservation, involving the title
to real estate thereon. Sections 5 of the Act gave the state courts power over such
actions as were not under the jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court. A contro-
versy arose among certain Seneca Indians. The plaintiff brought suit in a state
court to determine her right to certain reservation lands in her possession, alleg-
ing that she resided "outside the territorial jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court."
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings the complaint was dismissed. Held,
that the judgment should be affirmed since the complaint did not show that the
peacemakers' court was without jurisdiction. Mulkins v. Snow (Oct. 25, 1921)
N. Y. Ct. of App. Not yet reported; for the opinion below see (1919, Sup. Ct.)
io6 Misc. 556, 175 N. Y. Supp. 41.
Tribal Indians have a peculiar status: they are not citizens, and are, as a rule,
subject only to federal authority. United States v. Kagaina (1886) 118 U. S. 375,
6 Sup. Ct. 11og; Naganab v. Hitchcock (i9o6) 202 U. S. 473, 26 Sup. Ct. 667.
The federal government derives its power to control them from historic reasons
and from its sovereignty over the lands which they occupy. United States v.
Kagama, supra. When the tribal organization is recognized by the federal
government the Indians may regulate and govern their own internal affairs. In
re New York Indians (1866) 72 U. S. 761. They are, as a general rule, not
within the jurisdiction of a state, though residing within its geographic bound-
aries. United States v. Hamilton (1915, W. D. N. Y.) 233 Fed. 685. The state
cannot tax their lands. In re New York Indians, supra. The Indians cannot, in
the absence of an enabling statute, sue in a state court. Johnson v. L. I. Ry.
(1899) 42 App. Div. 626, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1139. The statute giving the Seneca
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Indians such power, has not been questioned. N. Y. Cons. Laws, 19o9, ch. 26,
sec. 54; George v. Pierce (1914, Sup. Ct.) 85 Misc. lO5, 148 N. Y. Supp. 230.
The law recognizing the jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court seems to be
declaratory of an existing rule. See Peters v. Tallchief (I9o7) 121 App. Div.
309, io6 N. Y. Supp. 64. This court has been recognized recently by a federal
court. United States v. Seneca Indians (i92i, W. D. N. Y.) 274 Fed. 946, 949.
It follows that the state court has only such jurisdiction over Indian affairs as is
given by the statute. Since the jurisdiction of the state court is supplementary
to that of the peacemakers' court, the allegation by the plaintiff that she resided
"outside the territorial jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court" amounted to no
more than an opinion that the state court had jurisdicti6n. In claiming a cause
of action under an exception incorporated in the body of a statute, the plaintiff
should have negatived the jurisdiction of the peacemakers' court. Rowell v.
Janvrin (1896) 151 N. Y. 6o, 66, 45 N. E. 398, 400.
MARTL.AL LAw-EXTENT OF PowER OF GOVERNOR TO DECLARE ITs ExISTENCE.-
The Governor of West Virginia proclaimed martial law in Mingo County. The
petitioner was arrested for carrying a pistol contrary to orders in the Governor's
proclamation, although he was duly licensed to do so by the civil authorities. At
the time of the arrest there was no regular military force in Mingo County, but
the Adjutant-General, holding a military commission, directed the civil authori-
ties and the posse comitatus. The petitioner obtained a writ of habeas corpus.
Held, that the writ should be sustained, as there was no regular military force
in the territory covered by the proclamation. Miller, J., dissenting. Ex parte
Lavinder (1921, W. Va.) io8 S. E. 428.
The governor of a state is the sole judge of conditions requiring a declaration
of martial law. Franks v. Smith (I91I) 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484; In re
McDonald (1914) 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947. But the extent of this power is
not settled. See Ballantine, Unconstitutional Claims of Military Authority
(1915) 24 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 189; Lobb, Civil Authority Veris Military (1919)
4 VA. L. REG. 897. He may suspend the civil laws until the exigency is over. In
re Boyle (18gq) 6 Idaho, 609, 57 Pac. 706; In re Moyer (1905) 35 Colo. 159, 85
Pac. 19o; United States v. Wolters (ig2o, S. D. Tex.) 268 Fed. 69. This is not
a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Moyer v. Peabody
(1909) 212 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 235. It is also held that the governor and those
who act under his authority are not responsible civilly or criminally for acts done
while martial law is in effect. Hatfield v. Graham (1914) 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E.
533; In re Moyer, supra; Commonwealth v. Shortall (1903) 2o6 Pa. I65, 55 Atl.
952. Some West Virginia cases have even held that persons may be arrested
outside the zone of martial law and that they may be tried by a military com-
mission, although the civil courts are still open. Ex parte Jones (1913) 71 W.
Va. 567, 77 S. E. 1O29; State v. Brown (1912) 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243. But
there are well-reasoned cases holding that the governor in declaring martial law
acts merely as a civil officer of the state* and that he must direct the military
forces in accordance with the civil laws. Franks v. Smith, supra; In re McDon-
ald, supra; cf. 2 Willoughby, The Constitution (igio) sec. 727. The decision in
the instant case siems to indicate a tendency to depart from former West Vir-
ginia decisions. The restriction of the power to a time when a regular military
force is in the field is desirable and it is hoped that it may aid in the ultimate
adoption as general law of the able dissenting opinions in the extreme West Vir-
ginia cases. For proposed legislative reform see Ballantine, Qualified Martial
Law, A Legislative Proposal (1915-1916) 14 MIcH. L. RrV. 1o2, 197.
PERSOxS-RIGHT OF MOTHER TO RECOVER FOR DEATH OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.-
An action was brought by the state on behalf of the mother of an illegitimate
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child for the latter's death. A statute gave a right of action in cases of wrongful
death for the benefit of husband, wife, parent, or child. Held, that the plaintiff
could not recover. State v. Hagerstozn. & Frederick Ry. (1921, Md.) 114
At. 729.
The mother of an illegitimate child cannot recover for its death under wrongful
death statutes. Robinson v. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co. (19o3) 117 Ga. 168, 43
S. E. 452; Lynch v. Knoop (19o7) 118 La. 61, 43 So. 252. The Court in the
instant case, following the general rule, placed its decision on the ground that
the statute was intended to cover only legitimate children. Md. Ann. Code
Laws, 1911, art. 67. The jaded argument that the mother would be permitted
to profit by her own wrong is also frequently urged to support such decisions.
But Maryland has clothed illegitimate children with the attributes of legitimacy
to the extent of allowing them to inherit and transmit inheritances. Md. Ann.
Code Laws, 1911, art. 46, sec. 3o. It is generally held that a mother is under
duty to support her illegitimate child. Galveston H. & S. Ry. v. Walker (1907)
48 Tex. Civ. App. 52, io6 S. W. 705. The statute in the instant case was general
and ought to have been construed in the light of the legislative purpose in
enacting it. The conclusion of the court, that "child" prima facie means "legiti-
mate child," was unjustified because the object of the statute was to provide
compensation for the wrongful death of a dependent and in no way related
to inheritance and kindred subjects where such a construction would be rea-
sonable, if not compelling. The trend of the law, as well as the probable intent
of the legislatures, is well illustrated by decisions and legislative enactments
in South Carolina. In 19o4, the Supreme Court refused to permit a mother
to recover for the death of her illegitimate child. McDonald v. Southern Ry.
(1904) 71 S. C. 352, 51 S. E. 138. In i9o6, an act was passed stating that in the
event of the death of an illegitimate child by wrongful act, the mother should
have the same rights and remedies as though such child had been born in lawful
wedlock'. See S. C. Code, 1912, sec. 3562; Croft v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.
(1909) 83 S. C. 232, 65 S. E. 216. The basis for the decision in the instant case
seems rather narrow and specious, and entirely out of sympathy with the better
view. See COMMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAW JouRxAL, 167; Andrzejewski v.
Northwestern Fuel Co. (1914) 158 Wis. 170, 148 N. W. 37; Hadley v. City of
Tallahassee (1914) 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545; Dickason Coal Co. v. Liddil (1911)
49 Ind. App. 4o, 94 N. E. 411.
PROPERTY-EscHEAT To STATE OF UNcLAIMED DEPosrrs IN NATIONAL BAN.-
The amount of certain deposits in the defendant national banks was for more
than twenty years unclaimed by the depositors or anyone succeeding to their
rights. A California statute (Sts. 1915, chs. 84, 555) provided that if deposits
in banks were unclaimed for twenty years their amount should escheat to the
state. The defendants contended that the law was inapplicable to national banks
as the state could not to this extent control their conduct, such control being solely
within the jurisdiction 6f the Federal Government. Held, that the right of a
depositor escheated to the state. State v. Anglo & London Paris Nat. Bank
(1921, Calif.) 20o Pac. 612.
Statutes providing that deposits which had remained inactive and unclaimed
in a savings bank for a certain number of years should be paid to the state
authorities, subject to being repaid by the state to a person afterwards
establishing a lawful right thereto, have been held constitutional as to the
bank. But these statutes were not styled statutes of escheats, nor were the
banks national banks. Provident Inst. for Savings v. Malone (1911) 221 U. S.
66o, 31 Sup. Ct. 661, it re Mass. Laws, 19o7, ch. 340, sec. i; Commonwealth
v. Dollar Savings Bank (1917) 259 Pa. 138, 1O2 At. 569, in re Pa. Laws, 1872,
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no. 49, secs. 2, 3. Such legislation would probably also be constitutional
as to the absent depositor. A statute providing for administration of assets
of an absentee as if he were dead, but making proper safeguard for the
protection of his interests in case of return has been upheld. Cunmis v. School
District (19o5) 198 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 721, in re Pa. Laws, 1885, no. 122.
The instant California Statute of Escheats provided for recovery by the former
owner if discovered, and its validity has been upheld in an earlier case as to
deposits in a state bank. State v. Security Savings Bank (1921, Calif.)igg Pac.
791. Since it does not conflict with any federal legislation controlling national
bank deposits, the instant case upholds its validity as to deposits in national banks.
At least one other case holds similarly under a similar statute State v. First
Nat. Bank (1912) 61 Or. 551, 123 Pac. 712, in re Or. Laws, igo9, ch. 36. In an
analogous case, where a state statute provided under certain conditions for the
escheat to the state of real estate in the hands of a corporation, the statute was
held to apply to realty held by a national bank for a purpose other than those
specified in the National Bank Act. Commonwealth v. Clark County Nat. Bank
(1919) 187 Ky. 151, 219 S. W. 175, in re Act of Apr. 5, 1893 (Carroll's Ky. Sts.
1915, sec. 567) and U. S. Act of June 3, 1864 (13 Stat. at L. lO7) ch. io6, sec. 28.
It has been said that the National Government is not in any case the sovereign to
which ownerless property of any sort in any state escheats. See Amer. Loan &
Trust Co. v. Grand Rivers Co. (19o8, C. C. W. D. Ky.) 159 Fed. 775.
WILLS-VALIDITY-NEcEssITY OF TESTAmENTARY INTENT.-The testator was a
candidate for a degree in a secret order, and as a part of the initiation, he exe-
cuted a paper which purported to be his last will and testament. Upon its being
offered for probate, certain heirs, believing that the instrument was executed
without any testamentary intent, contested its validity. Held, that the writing
was a valid will. In re Watkin's Estate (1921, Wash.) 198 Pac. 721.
It is well settled that an instrument, although satisfying all the formal 'require-
ments of a will, does not operate as such unless executed with animus testandi.
In re Meade's Estate (1897) 118 Calif. 428, 50 Pac. 541; Clark v. Hugo (1921,
Va.) io7 S. E. 73o. A will executed in ignorance of its true character is a nullity.
lt re Gluckmia's Will (1917) 87 N. J. Eq. 638, IOI Atl. 295. Even though the
true character of the instrument be known, .if it was executed to effect some pur-
pose other than a testamentary disposition of property, it is invalid. Fleming v.
Morrison (19o4) 187 Mass. 12o, 72 N. E. 499. Under this rule a will written as
a specimen of brevity was denied probate. Nichols v. Nichols (1814) 2 Phil.
Eccl. i8o. And likewise, a will executed in jest was invalid. See Lester v. Smith
(1863, Eccl.) 3 Sw. & Tr. 282. Schouler, Wills (3d ed. 19oo) sec. 278. As a
general rule, however, the courts are reluctant to declare a will invalid which
satisfies all the statutory requirements as to form and execution, and probate will
be denied only when the proof is clear and convincing that the will was executed
to effect a purpose wholly inconsistent with the intent expressed in the instru-
ment. Brown v. Avery (1912) 63 Fla. 355, 58 So. 34.. Clark v. Hugo, supra.
And a few courts have held that the existence of the animus testandi is conclu-
sively presumed from a writing containing every element of a valid will, and
incapable of operating in any other way. In re Kennedy (igio) 159 Mich. 548,
124 N. W. 516. In the instant case the testimony of members of the secret order
was somewhat conflicting as to the purpose of the alleged will, and in the absence
of convincing evidence of a non-testamentary intent, the Court seems to have
correctly sustained its validity.
